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INTRODUCTION
Somewhere on the periphery of Middle Eastern-American politics is the story of Yasser Abbas. Yasser Abbas is a businessman
and the son of Mahmoud Abbas, leader of the Palestinian Authority. In 2012, Foreign Policy magazine published an article questioning
the sources of Yasser Abbas’ wealth.1 The article alleged that Abbas had accumulated his wealth through his family lineage and po*

J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2017; B.A., Classics,
Bowdoin College, 2011. Thanks to Professor Benjamin Zipursky for his guidance,
support, and thoughtful critique; thanks to the Board of the IPLJ for its generosity and
assistance this year; and thanks to Dorothy Kadar for her unwavering love and friendship.
1
Jonathan Schanzer, The Brothers Abbas, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 5, 2012),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/05/the-brothers-abbas/
[https://perma.cc/A929PVS6].
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litical ties, as well as from American taxpayers.2 Abbas then sued
Foreign Policy’s publisher in federal court in the District of Columbia.3 Foreign Policy sought a quick dismissal under the District of
Columbia’s recently enacted anti-SLAPP statute.4 Anti-SLAPP
statutes are meant to deter filing of meritless suits meant to chill
free speech.5 District Judge Sullivan granted Foreign Policy’s motion and dismissed the suit.6
Abbas appealed dismissal of his defamation suit on the ground
that federal courts should not be governed by non-federal procedural devices—like the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute—aimed at implementing state and local anti-litigation policies.7 Deviating from the majority of other federal courts of appeals
that have addressed the issue (i.e., the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits), the D.C. Circuit accepted Abbas’s federalist argument.8
The D.C. Circuit held that the District of Columbia’s special motion to dismiss statute did not apply in federal courts sitting in diversity.9 Employing the analysis laid out by the Supreme Court in
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,10
the D.C. Circuit found that Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure govern in a federal diversity case, and therefore
denied application of the District of Columbia’s special motion to
dismiss statute.11 Admittedly, Abbas enjoyed only a Pyrrhic victory
2

See id.
Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 975 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 783
F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
4
Id. at 9–10.
5
“SLAPP” is an acronym standing for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation.” See discussion infra Section I.A.
6
Abbas, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
7
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1332.
8
Id. at 1335–36.
9
Id.
10
559 U.S. 393 (2010). In Shady Grove, the United States Supreme Court, in a plurality
decision, found that section 901(b) of New York’s Civil Practice and Law Rules did not
apply in federal diversity jurisdiction because section 901(b) conflicted with Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 399. The Court applied a two-step framework for
deciding whether to apply a Federal Rule or a state law in diversity jurisdiction. First, a
court should not apply a state law if a Federal Rule “answer[s] the same question” as the
state law. Id. at 398–99. Second, a court must apply the Federal Rule if it does not violate
the Rules Enabling Act. Id.
11
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333.
3
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because the D.C. Circuit actually applied the federal rules to reach
the same result, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal.12 Nevertheless, Abbas puts a federalist issue in free speech litigation front
and center: Are federal courts required to accord deference to the
twenty-eight states who seek to curb abusive litigation practices
attacking free speech? Are they even permitted to do so?
This Note compares the different treatment of state antiSLAPP laws in federal courts, especially in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Shady Grove. This Note posits two reasons why
special motions to dismiss should not apply in federal courts sitting
in diversity jurisdiction. First, state anti-SLAPPs conflict directly
with Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because these Federal Rules directly address the question as to dismissal on the pleadings and on summary judgment. Second, a finding that the state anti-SLAPP procedures conflict with the Federal
Rules will not frustrate legislatures’ interests in swatting down
chilling litigation. This is so because federal courts retain the power
to screen meritless defamation suits through the available pleading
and summary judgment rules.
Part I introduces the two main legal authorities whose convergence is the topic of this Note: state anti-SLAPP laws, provisions
that either immunize certain speech or dismiss litigation chilling
free speech; and Shady Grove,13 the most recent opinion on Federal
Rule-state rule conflicts. Part II analyzes federal diversity cases applying anti-SLAPP special motions since Shady Grove, notably, Godin v. Schencks14 and Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC.15 It also
looks at other courts’ responses to this problem. Part III then argues that federal courts should not apply anti-SLAPP provisions
that generate powerful state-based motions to dismiss. Lastly, this
Note concludes that the approach in Abbas and similar cases does
not frustrate the aims of anti-SLAPP laws.

12
13
14
15

Id. at 1339–40.
559 U.S. 393 (2010).
629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010).
783 F.3d at 1328.
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I. ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES AND SHADY GROVE
A. Anti-SLAPP Statutes
In 1992, professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan
coined the term “SLAPP”—Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation—in response to a growing number of suits attempting
to stifle political speech.16 Such lawsuits target individuals and
groups participating in political advocacy and government petitioning.17 Under numerous aliases, including defamation, SLAPP filers
attempt to “privatize public debate . . . transform[ing] a public, political dispute into a private, legal adjudication” at the expense of
defendants.18 The suits, usually meritless, force defendants to
spend money mounting a legal defense.19 When defendants win, it
is a Pyrrhic victory because they have spent considerable sums in
filing and attorney’s fees.20 Defendants without resources face defaults or unfavorable settlements.21 Most importantly, the suits discourage future speech—a severe threat to First Amendment expression.22
To combat the proliferation of SLAPPs, Professors Pring and
Canan argued for legislation, inter alia,23 to combat protected
16

George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation” (“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 938 (1992).
17
Id. Examples of targeted political activity that professors Pring and Canan cited
include:
Voicing criticism at a school board meeting; [t]estifying at a zoning
hearing against a new real estate development; [s]ending a letter to
public officials; [r]eporting police misconduct; [f]iling a complaint
with a government consumer, civil rights, or labor relations office;
[r]eporting violations of law to health authorities; [l]obbying for
reform legislation; [and] [f]iling administrative agency appeals.
Id.
18
Id. at 941–42 (“Thus, citizens may involve themselves in a city hall zoning dispute,
only to find that ‘city hall’ has become ‘courtroom,’ and ‘zoning’ has become
‘defamation’ or ‘interference with business.’”).
19
See id. at 943–44.
20
See id. at 944.
21
See id.
22
See id. (citing Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 616
N.Y.S.2d 98 (1994)).
23
See id. at 950. Pring and Canan argued for lawyers representing SLAPP targets to file
a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. Id.
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speech.24 The professors suggested two kinds of legislation to combat pernicious SLAPP suits. The first was an anti-SLAPP statute
creating substantive privileges and immunities for protected
speech.25 The second, relying on Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court,26 would establish procedural safeguards
to summarily dispose of SLAPP suits and deter would-be SLAPP
filers.27
States have heeded the warnings of Professors Pring and Canan. As of the end of 2015, twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.28 Colorado
and West Virginia have implemented similar rules through judicial
precedent.29 The various statutes are not uniform in their application; states employ either one or both of the substantive and procedural safeguards.30

24

See id. at 958.
See id. at 958–59.
26
Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984)
(establishing summary disposition and burden-shifting standards in a SLAPP case
targeting defendant’s petitioning activity).
27
See Pring & Canan, supra note 16, at 959–61.
28
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 to -752 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501
to -508 (2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16–425.18 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 8136–8138 (1992); D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to -5505 (2012); FLA. STAT.
§§ 720.304, 768.295 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (1998); 7 GUAM CODE ANN.
§§ 17101–17109 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to -4 (2002); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
110/1–110/99 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (1998); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN.
art. 971 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 5-807 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (1996); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01–
.06 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,241–,246 (1994);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635–.670 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-2-9.1–.2 (2001); N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1430–1440
(2014); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150–.155 (2010); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7707, 8301–8305
(2001); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1004
(1997); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West 2011); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78b-6-1401 to -1405 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (2005); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500–.525 (2010).
29
See generally Protect Our Mountain Env’t, 677 P.2d 1361; Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d
549 (W. Va. 1993).
30
Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500–.525 (containing both privilege/immunity
provisions and special motions to dismiss), with D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to -5505
(containing only a special motion to dismiss provision), and 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to
-4 (containing only a privilege/immunity provision).
25
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Some anti-SLAPP statutes grant immunity to only certain
speech or protected activity. These statutes are based in part on the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine31 and in part on common law immunities.32 For example, Rhode Island’s section 9-33-2 grants conditional immunity to speech exercised under the right of petition or
free speech in connection with a matter of public concern.33 It
carves an exception for sham proceedings. The statute exempts the
targeted party’s petitioning or free speech activity if it is objectively
and subjectively baseless, mirroring the requirements set out in
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc.34 However, Professors Pring and Canan warned that such immunity provisions were imperfect safeguards for SLAPP targets.35
31

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine grants immunity to citizens petitioning the
government from antitrust liability through the Petition Clause of the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); accord In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 685–86 (2d Cir. 2009). This immunity extends to
concerted actions before courts and administrative agencies. See Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. at 510–11. When, however, petitioning activity “ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action[] is a . . . sham to cover what is . . . nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor[, then] the
application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. The sham
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not insulate petitioning activity that is
both objectively baseless and an attempt to directly interfere with a competitor’s business
relationships through the use of the governmental process. See Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs,
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). Whether the NoerrPennington doctrine applies outside of the antitrust context is a question of some dispute.
See, e.g., White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine to be generally applicable as a First Amendment principle); Mosdos Chofetz
Chaim, Inc. v. Vill. of Wesley Hills, 701 F. Supp. 2d 568, 594–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(collecting cases and finding the doctrine applicable in a civil rights suit).
32
Three privileges come to mind. First, the judicial privilege grants people absolute
immunity for “communications which are issued in the regular course of judicial
proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought.”
Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 71 (Pa. 2004). Second, there exists a qualified privilege
for defamatory statements made by private individuals to police or state attorneys prior to
institution of criminal suits. See Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992).
Last, defamatory statements in publications that are a “full, fair, and accurate account of
[an] official proceeding” receive qualified immunity under the fair-report privilege.
Catalanello v. Kramer, 18 F. Supp. 3d 504, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
33
See 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (1993).
34
See id.; see also Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60.
35
Pring & Canan, supra note 16, at 958.
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Enter the special motion to dismiss, the preferred solution of
Professors Pring and Canan and twenty-five jurisdictions.36 The
special motions to dismiss resemble the standard set forth in Protect
Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court.37 Looking at the
Washington anti-SLAPP statute is instructive. First, the antiSLAPP statute applies in any case based on the right to petition or
the right to free speech in connection with an issue of public concern.38 Next, the special motion requires the movant to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that its action was based on the
above First Amendment rights.39 If the movant meets that burden,
the non-movant must then demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it will prevail on the claim.40 The court must consider
the pleadings and outside affidavits stating facts upon which the
liability or defense is based.41 It must also stay all discovery pending
resolution of the motion, with targeted discovery allowed for good
cause shown.42 Finally, the motion moves up the judge’s docket,
and if the movant wins, it receives attorney’s fees.43
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute presents a variant strain on the
special motion, one based on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.44 SLAPP filers must verify that the pleadings: (1) are
grounded in fact; (2) are warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument requiring its change; (3) do not assert claims against
36

Id. at 959–61.
677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984). The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the court
should treat the motion as one for summary judgment based on a heightened
constitutional standard when plaintiff sues for judicial or administrative abuse of process
and defendant files a motion to dismiss based on the right to petition. Id. at 1370. Plaintiff
must show that defendant’s petitioning was not immunized under the First Amendment
because: (1) defendant’s claims had no cognizable basis in law or fact; (2) the primary
purpose of defendant’s activity was to harass plaintiff or accomplish an improper
objective; and (3) defendant’s petitioning adversely affected plaintiff’s legal interests. Id.
at 1369.
38
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(a)–(e) (2010).
39
§ 4.24.525(4)(a)–(b).
40
§ 4.24.525(4)(b).
41
§ 4.24.525(4)(c). Note the mandatory nature of this rule, especially in contrast to
Rule 12(d). See discussion infra Section II.C.2.
42
§ 4.24.525(5)(c).
43
§ 4.24.525(5)(c), (6)(a)(i).
44
See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (1996); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-506 (2005)
(containing a verification requirement in place of the special motion to dismiss).
37
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statements privileged by Georgia’s privilege provision; and (4) are
not asserted to suppress free speech, harass, delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.45 The claim is stricken if it is not verified within ten days.46 If plaintiff verifies in violation of the statute,
the court may dismiss the claim and impose sanctions.47
Because the anti-SLAPP statutes expressly incorporate the language of the First Amendment defamation cases, they seek to add
another layer of protection to certain speech. Professors Pring and
Canan noted that many SLAPP cases are filed as defamation cases.48 In turn, states like Washington apply the special motions to
dismiss when the defendant’s action includes:
Any oral statement made, or written statement or
other document submitted, in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue
of public concern; or [a]ny other lawful conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional
right of free speech in connection with an issue of
public concern, or in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition.49
Statements “in connection with an issue of public concern” include speech protected in cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan,50 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,51 and Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps.52 Provisions like these give defendants, especially

45

§ 9-11-11.1(b).
Id.
47
Id. For a recent defamation case holding that section 9-11-11.1 of the Georgie code
violates Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Royalty Network, Inc. v.
Harris, 756 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2014).
48
Pring & Canan, supra note 16, at 947.
49
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(d)–(e) (2010).
50
376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that, in libel cases, the First Amendment
requires plaintiffs who are public officials to prove that defendants published statements
with actual malice—knowledge of or reckless disregard toward the statements’ falsity).
51
388 U.S. 130, 134, 155 (1967) (extending Sullivan to apply to public figures—people
“who are not public officials, but who are . . . involved in issues in which the public has a
justified and important interest”).
52
475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (holding that, under the First Amendment, private figures
in libel cases suing over an issue of public concern have the burden of proving both falsity
and fault before recovering damages, in contravention of the common law of libel).
46
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media defendants, yet another tool to fight defamation suits: summary disposition at the pleading stage.
The special motion to dismiss is ultimately one more protection
given to defendants in public figure libel cases based on the First
Amendment. First, public officials and figures must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that defendants published with “actual
malice” (i.e., with either knowledge or reckless disregard as to the
statements’ falsity).53 Second, courts cannot hold defendants
strictly liable in a libel case under the First Amendment.54 Third,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving a publication’s falsity, as well
as fault, before recovering damages—an inversion of the commonlaw rule.55 Fourth, the First Amendment precludes recovery from
statements that “could not reasonably have been interpreted as
stating actual facts about the public figure involved.”56 Fifth, plaintiffs must also prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence
at summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or on a motion for directed verdict under Rule 50.57
Last, appellate courts must engage in de novo review of the whole
record in constitutional defamation cases, bypassing Rule 52(a).58
B. Shady Grove and the Federal Rules
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance
Co., petitioner medical practice sought to maintain a class action in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York under
Rule 23.59 Petitioner also asserted federal jurisdiction over the
claims under the Class Action Fairness Act.60 Petitioner tendered a
53

See Butts, 388 U.S. at 155; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
55
See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776.
56
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); see also Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284–
86 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970).
57
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
58
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 492, 499 (1984); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”).
59
See 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010).
60
See id. at 397 n.3. The Class Action Fairness Act grants federal courts jurisdiction
over class actions under Rule 23 where: (1) the aggregate value of the claims exceeds five
54
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claim for insurance benefits to respondent Allstate Insurance
Company, which paid the claims late and refused to pay the accrued interest on the overdue payments.61 Petitioner sought relief
on behalf of a class of all to whom respondent Allstate owed interest.62 The District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for two reasons.63 First, it
found that section 901(b) precluded class actions from recovering a
“penalty.”64 Second, because petitioner could no longer maintain
its suit as a class action, the court found that its individual claim,
approximately five hundred dollars, did not meet the amount-incontroversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).65 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that there was no
conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b), that section 901(b)
was substantive under Erie, and that section 901(b) thus applied in
federal diversity suits.66
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, finding that
petitioner could file a suit under Rule 23.67 The Court laid out a
two-step framework to determine whether a federal rule or state
rule applied in a federal diversity case. First, a court must determine whether the rule “answers the question in dispute. If it does,
it governs.”68 In Shady Grove, the question was whether petitioner
could maintain his suit as a class action.69 The Court found that by
million dollars and (2) minimal diversity exists between the parties (i.e., any plaintiff is
from a different state than any defendant). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012).
61
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397.
62
Id.
63
See id. (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F.
Supp. 2d 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
64
Id.
65
Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2015) (“Unless a statute creating or
imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the
recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of
recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.” (emphasis
added)).
66
Id. at 398 (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d
137 (2d Cir. 2008)).
67
Id. at 399.
68
Id. at 398 (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5, (1987) (“The
initial step is to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of Federal Rule 38 is
sufficiently broad to cause a direct collision with the state law or, implicitly, to control the
issue before the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law.”)).
69
Id.
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the terms of Rule 23, a “class action may be maintained” if the two
criteria set forth in Rule 23(a) and 23(b) are met.70 Rule 23 directly
conflicts with section 901(b), which states that actions seeking statutory penalties “may not be maintained” as a class action.71
Therefore, under the first step, section 901(b) cannot apply, unless
Rule 23 is ultra vires.72
Second, a court must determine whether the federal rule “falls
within the statutory authorization” of the Rules Enabling Act.73
Congress has the power both to supplant state law and to create
rules for the federal courts.74 The test for a federal rule’s validity is
whether the rule “abridge[s], enlarge[s,] or modif[ies] any substantive right,” which in turn requires asking whether the rule “really
regulates procedure.”75 The Court found that Rule 23 falls within
the Rules Enabling Act because a class action is merely a process
for adjudicating multiple claims at once.76 It neither changes the
parties’ legal rights nor alters the rules of decision.77 The Court
emphasized the tough challenge any party faces when attempting
to displace a federal rule: “We have rejected every statutory chal-

70

Id. at 398–99; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if . . . .” (emphasis added));
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and
if . . . .” (emphasis added)).
71
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2015).
72
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 399.
73
Id. at 406; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect.”).
74
Id. at 406; see also Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 5 (“The Rule must then be
applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress’ rulemaking authority, which
originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed on this Court by the Rules Enabling
Act”).
75
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406–07 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012)); see also
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (defining procedure as “the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them”)).
76
Id. at 408.
77
Id.
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lenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us.”78 Because the
federal rule applied and was not invalid, the Court felt no need to
conduct the “murky” Erie analysis (i.e., whether enforcement of a
right in state or federal court would encourage forum shopping and
inequitable administration of the laws).79
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and in the judgment, joined
the majority on the narrowest ground: Rule 23 applied in the instant case.80 However, he also agreed with the dissent in arguing
that some state procedural rules might apply in federal court because such rules are a part of the “state’s definition of substantive
rights and remedies.”81 Justice Stevens called for application of the
Rules Enabling Act with sensitivity to important state interests and
regulatory policies.82 Ultimately, Justice Stevens said, a federal rule
does not apply in a case where the state law is procedural “but is so
intertwined with a state right or remedy that functions to define the
scope of the state-created right.”83 In the instant case, he concluded that section 901(b) did not define New York’s rights and

78

Id. at 407; see also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 554 (1991) (upholding the validity of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 8 (upholding the validity of Rule 38 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (upholding
the validity of Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964) (upholding the validity of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946)
(upholding the validity of Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Sibbach, 312
U.S. at 14–15 (1941) (upholding the validity of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
79
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. The Court in Shady Grove cited Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Hanna, two of the seminal cases on the Erie doctrine.
In Erie, the Supreme Court overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), announcing that in
federal cases invoking diversity jurisdiction, the law of the state is the rule of decision
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress.” Erie,
304 U.S. at 77–78. Nearly thirty years later, in Hanna, the Court reflected on the Erie
doctrine in light of the Rules Enabling Act. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463–64. There, the
Court held that in federal diversity cases where a state rule conflicts with a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure, courts should apply the federal rule if it neither exceeds the Rules
Enabling Act nor transgresses the Constitution. See id.
80
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
81
Id. at 417.
82
Id. at 424.
83
Id. at 423.
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remedies, and that Rule 23 did not violate the Rules Enabling
Act.84
In short, Shady Grove held that section 901(b) did not apply in
federal cases invoking diversity jurisdiction.85 First, because Rule
23 entitles any eligible party to file a class action, it supplants state
laws prohibiting the same suits.86 Second, Rule 23 is valid under
the Rules Enabling Act and the U.S. Constitution.87 Justice Stevens, however, wrote separately to add that some state procedural
rules might be a part of “the [s]tate’s definition of substantive
rights and remedies.”88
II. ANTI-SLAPP CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS
A. Godin v. Schencks
In Godin v. Schenks, Pat Godin, a former principal at an elementary school in Maine, filed a defamation suit against defendants
Patty Schencks and two other individual defendants.89 She also
filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Machiasport School
Department Board of Directors and School Union No. 134, alleging
due process violations.90 After plaintiff was hired as principal of the
Fort O’Brien Elementary School in 2006, the school received
complaints about plaintiff’s conduct toward students from the
three individual defendants.91 In May 2008, the school board conducted an investigation into plaintiff’s allegedly abusive conduct; a
month later, the investigation concluded the allegations were unsupported.92 On June 6, 2008, Godin received notice from the
school board that her employment was terminated due to “budge84

Id. at 432.
Id. at 399 (majority opinion).
86
Id. at 398–99.
87
Id. at 408.
88
Id. at 416–17 (Stevens, J., concurring).
89
629 F.3d 79, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2010).
90
Id. at 80. The claims against defendants School Board and Union No. 134 were not
under review on appeal to the First Circuit. Id.
91
Id. at 81 n.1. Defendants Schencks, Nicely, and Metta reported to either the school
board, the Maine Department of Health, or Human Services and the Maine State Police
that plaintiff treated her students abusively. Id.
92
Id. at 81.
85
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tary constraints caused by ‘significant subsidy loss.’”93 Godin then
sued the school board and the union under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
brought state law defamation claims against former school employees Schencks, Nicely, and Metta.94
The individual defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under the Maine anti-SLAPP statute, section 556.95 Plaintiff did not
dispute that the individual claims derived from defendants’ exercise of their right to petition.96 Under section 556, a party may
move to dismiss an action when it asserts that the adversary’s
claims are “based on the moving party’s exercise of the moving
party’s right of petition” under either the Maine or U.S. Constitution.97 A court must grant the special motion, unless the nonmovant demonstrates: (1) that movant’s exercise of its right of petition lacked “any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in
law” and (2) that movant’s acts “caused actual injury to the responding party.”98 In addition, a court must look at both the pleading and the supporting and opposing affidavits.99 Last, a court must
also stay discovery unless the court finds, “on motion and after a
hearing and for good cause shown,” that “specified discovery be
conducted.”100
The district court denied the special motion, holding that section 556 conflicted with Rules 12 and 56 and therefore did not apply
in federal court. The First Circuit first determined, sua sponte, that
it had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims.101
Second, on interlocutory appeal, the court found that it had appellate jurisdiction over the order denying section 556 under the collateral order doctrine.102 Next, the court had to determine whether
section 556 applied in the instant federal proceeding.
93

Id.
Id.
95
Id. at 81–82; see also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2012).
96
Godin, 629 F.3d at 82 (quoting § 556).
97
§ 556.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. The statute also provides a successful movant with costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees. Id.
101
Godin, 629 F.3d at 83.
102
See id. at 83–84; see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949) (establishing the collateral order doctrine and finding appealable those orders that
94
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Because the court had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
state law claims, it had to engage in the general Erie analysis: determining whether section 556 was a “substantive” or “procedural” rule.103 First, it held that Federal Rules 12 and 56 did not
preempt application of section 556 because those two rules did not
attempt to answer the same question or address the same subject as
section 556.104 Section 556 provides a supplemental and substantive
mechanism to protect defendants exercising constitutional petitioning activities.105 Rules 12 and 56, on the other hand, govern all
categories of suits.106 Rule 12(b)(6) only exists to “test the sufficiency of the complaint,” whereas section 556 dismisses claims
where plaintiff challenges defendant’s petitioning activity yet cannot meet Maine’s special rules for protecting such activity.107 Rule
56, on the one hand, grants parties judgment before trial when
there are no disputed material issues of fact, and as a matter of law,
one party is entitled to judgment.108 Section 556, on the other hand,
requires courts to consider whether the defendant’s conduct had a
reasonable basis in fact or law and whether the conduct caused injury.109 For those reasons, the court found section 556 addressed
neither of the questions posed by Rules 12 and 56.110 The court
avoided conducting a Rules Enabling Act analysis.111

“finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”).
103
Godin, 629 F.3d at 85; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law.”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988)
(finding that Erie applies when a federal court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over a
state law claim).
104
Godin, 629 F.3d at 88.
105
Id.
106
Id.; see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980) (“The first
question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently
broad to control the issue before the Court.”).
107
Godin, 629 F.3d at 89 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 89–90.
111
Id. at 90.
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The court found that failing to apply section 556 would encourage forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law.112
Section 556 “substantively alters [state]-law claims” by shifting the
burden to plaintiff to prove that defendant’s petitioning had no legal or factual basis, by awarding attorney’s fees to successful defendants, and by replacing the common-law libel per se damages
standard with an actual injury standard.113 If such a rule does not
apply in federal court, plaintiffs would have a strong incentive to
file state-law claims in federal court, avoiding section 556 altogether.114 Inequitable administration of the law would result; defendants in federal court would have fewer protections than an identical defendant in state court.115 As a result, the court reversed the
district court’s order and remanded the case.116
B. Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group
Plaintiff Yasser Abbas is the son of Palestinian Authority leader
Mahmoud Abbas and is a businessman with interests in the Middle
East.117 In Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, Abbas sued defednants
Foreign Policy magazine and journalist Jonathan Schanzer based on
an online article titled “The Brothers Abbas.”118 The article addressed the sources of his and his brother Tarek’s wealth.119 Specifically, the article begins with two questions: “Are the sons of the
Palestinian president off their father’s system?” and “Have they
enriched themselves at the expense of regular Palestinians—and
even U.S. taxpayers?”120 Among other things, the article chronicles allegations of corruption leveled against Mahmoud Abbas, noting his sons’ conspicuous wealth.121 Once Abbas filed suit, defendants moved to dismiss under both District of Columbia section 165502(a) and Rule 12(b)(6).122 The district court granted defendants
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 92.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id.
Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., 783 F.3d 1328, at 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
See Schanzer, supra note 1.
Id.
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1331.
See Schanzer, supra note 1.
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333.
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the special motion to dismiss and denied their Rule 12(b)(6) motion
as moot.123
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s
decision on the defendant’s special motion to dismiss.124 The court
first found a conflict between the federal rules and section 165502(a); both “answer the same question” as to the circumstances
when a court must dismiss a case before trial.125 To survive a section 16-5502(a) special motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must show
that it is likely to succeed on the merits.126 Rule 12(b)(6) allows
plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss by “simply alleging facts”
sufficient to state a facially plausible claim.127 Rule 56(a) permits
summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”128 Rules 12 and 56 form an exclusive,
integrated, and less stringent program for determining pretrial
judgment in federal court.129 Therefore, the court found the federal
rules were broad enough to displace section 16-5502(a).130
Comparing Rules 12 and 56, the court found that those rules
did not violate the Rules Enabling Act,131 which states that federal
rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.”132 Here, the court noted the difficulty of applying Shady
Grove: the fractured decision holds no “common conclusion” for
determining what standard governs when comparing federal rules
with the Rules Enabling Act.133 The court sided with the Scalia plu123

Id.
Id. at 1332.
125
Id. at 1333–34, 1336.
126
See id. at 1332; see also D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b) (2012).
127
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
128
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
129
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334.
130
Id. The court also rejected claims defending the provision as applicable because: (1)
it is simply another layer to add to a Rule 56 summary judgment motion; (2) the special
motion is another way of creating a form of qualified immunity; (3) the federal rules, as
evidenced by Congressional amendment (i.e., the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995) are not to be rigidly construed; and (4) other Courts of Appeals have found
so. See id. at 1334–36.
131
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337.
132
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
133
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
124
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rality and applied Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. Rules 12 and 56, according to the plurality in Shady Grove, “really regulate[] procedure.”
Therefore, Rules 12 and 56 applied, and the court denied defendant’s special motion to dismiss.
The court, however, still dismissed plaintiff’s claim under Rule
12(b)(6).134 Applying the plausibility pleading standard required by
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,135 the court held that defendant had
not made a defamatory statement about plaintiff.136 Defendant had
merely asked questions. A “question,” the court said, “however
embarrassing or unpleasant to its subject, is not accusation.”137 It
then remarked that questions had rarely given rise to successful
defamation claims in other jurisdictions.138 The court refused to
chart new territory in defamation law, and thus dismissed plaintiff’s claim.139
C. Other Cases
The federal landscape is divided. Other circuits have weighed
in on whether anti-SLAPPs are substantive or procedural under
Erie with a resultant split on either side. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have found that anti-SLAPPs apply in federal court.140 The
Seventh Circuit, however, has held that Washington’s anti-SLAPP
statute does not apply in federal court, but decided the case on different grounds than its lower court.141

134

Id. at 1339.
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (retiring the liberal pleading standard allowed by Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and requiring plaintiffs “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face”).
136
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1338–39.
137
Id. at 1338 (quoting Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1094 (4th Cir.
1993)).
138
Id. at 1338–39.
139
Id. at 1339.
140
See Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press LLC, 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009); United
States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir.1999).
141
Compare Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 791 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015)
(applying the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision that section 4.24.525 violates the
right to trial by jury under the Washington Constitution), with Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel
Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (finding that section 4.24.525
conflicts with Rules 12(d) and 56 and therefore does not apply in diversity suits).
135
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1. Pro-Substance: Henry and Newsham
In Henry v. Lake Charles American Press LLC, the Fifth Circuit
applied article 971 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and
dismissed plaintiff’s defamation claim.142 There, the plaintiff, owner of a military jet fuel concern, sued the defendant after it had published that defendant sold “contaminated fuel” to the government
that caused its military aircraft to “flame out.”143 The lower court
denied defendant’s special motion to dismiss, and defendant appealed.144 In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit wrote that “Louisiana
law, including the nominally-procedural article 971, governs this
diversity case.”145
Applying state law interpreting article 971, the court found that
defendant had made a prima facie showing that it published on an
issue of public concern.146 Having shifted its burden, the plaintiff
then had to show, on the motion to dismiss, a probability of success
on the merits using the pleadings as well as supporting and opposing affidavits.147 The court found that the plaintiff had little chance
of proving the defendant had not reasonably inquired into the falsity of its statements, partly because the district court, in applying
article 971, had stayed discovery.148 With little evidence, the plaintiff could not prove the requisite elements of libel, and the court
dismissed.
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., a
case on which the Henry court relied, provides a more helpful analysis of the nature of the anti-SLAPP statute.149 Though decided
eleven years before Shady Grove, Newsham compared California’s
anti-SLAPP provision, section 425.16, with Federal Rules 12 and 56
in the same framework.150 The plaintiffs sued Lockheed Missiles

142

566 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 168–69 (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Newsham, 190
F.3d at 972–73).
146
Id. at 181.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 181–83.
149
Newsham, 190 F.3d at 972.
150
Id. at 972.
143
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under the False Claims Act151 for fraudulently billing the federal
government.152 Lockheed Missiles filed a counterclaim, at which
point the plaintiffs moved to dismiss under the California antiSLAPP statute and Rule 12(b)(6).153 On recommendation from a
special master, the district court granted the relators’ special motion to dismiss.154 Relators appealed, wishing to recover attorney’s
fees under the anti-SLAPP provision.155
The Ninth Circuit found that the provision applied in federal
court, remanding the case for the district court to rule on the motion.156 First, the court asked whether the anti-SLAPP statute
would directly collide with the Federal Rules.157 Although it admitted a “commonality of purpose” between the two rules, namely,
“expeditious weeding out of meritless claims before trial,” the
court found no conflict.158 First, it saw no indication that Rules 12
and 56 were meant to occupy the field of pretrial procedures.159
Second, the anti-SLAPP statute concerned an interest separate
from that of the federal rules: protection of constitutional free
speech and petition.160 Next, defendant had identified no countervailing federal interest requiring application of Rules 12 and 56.161
Finally, the court found that serious forum-shopping concerns
would arise if it had failed to apply the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs would always seek a federal forum, knowing the statute would
not apply.162 Therefore, the court applied the California antiSLAPP statute.
It should be noted that several Ninth Circuit judges have expressed disagreement with the holding announced by the three151

The False Claims Act allows private individuals, known as “relators,” to file civil
suits in the name of the government against persons who make fraudulent claims for
payment to the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012).
152
Newsham, 190 F.3d at 967.
153
Id. at 972.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 973.
157
Id. at 972.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 973.
161
Id.
162
Id.
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judge panel in Newsham. In Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC
(Trump II), Circuit Judge Watford and three other judges dissented
from the denial of rehearing en banc of an anti-SLAPP motion to
strike.163 In the first appeal, Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC
(Trump I), the Ninth Circuit had dismissed Trump University’s
defamation counterclaim against Makaeff, finding her letters and
postings protected First Amendment speech.164 Dissenting in
Trump II, Judge Watford found that section 425.16 conflicted with
the federal rules.165 Ultimately, Judge Watford argued that Rules 12
and 56, linked by the mandatory language of Rule 12(d), “establish
the exclusive criteria for testing the legal and factual sufficiency of
a claim in federal court.”166
2. Pro-Procedure: Intercon
The Seventh Circuit, in Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel Action
Network, has found Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute inapplicable
in federal court, by way of irony: it followed precedent from the
Supreme Court of Washington.167 The Seventh Circuit in Intercon
chose not to decide whether Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute
conflicted with the federal rules, as the Northern District of Illinois
District Court had done below.168 Instead, it followed state decisional law—substantive law under Erie.169 Because the Supreme
Court of Washington found that section 4.24.525 violated the
Washington Constitution’s right to trial by jury, there was “no remaining state substance” to compare against Rules 12 and 56.170
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court.171
The lower court, however, squarely faced the issue in a lengthy,
complicated opinion. Plaintiff Intercon Solutions was a provider of

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Trump II), 736 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013).
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC (Trump I), 715 F.3d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 2013).
Trump II, 736 F.3d at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1188.
791 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 864 (Wash. 2015)).
Id.
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electronic recycling services in Illinois.172 It had asked defendant, a
certifier of electronic recycling businesses, to perform an audit so
that it could obtain e-Stewards certification.173 Among other things,
plaintiff sued in defamation and false light, claiming that defendant
falsely published that Intercon shipped two containers of illegal and
hazardous materials to Hong Kong and China.174 Defendant had
published this information on its own website, and released it to
“selected news media” and the Illinois and federal environmental
protection agencies.175
Defendants sought to dismiss the action on two fronts. First,
defendants asserted that they were immune from liability under
section 4.24.510176 because defendant’s publications conveyed information to government agencies and were of reasonable concern
to them.177 Second, defendants sought to apply section 4.24.525,
the special motion to dismiss, because defendant’s actions involved
public participation and plaintiff could not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would prevail on its claims.178
The district court found that defendant’s statements, when released to the Illinois and federal environmental protection agencies, were immune from civil liability.179 Section 4.24.510 requires
that: (1) the statement must be reported to a “branch or agency of
federal, state, or local government,” and (2) the statement must be
regarding a “matter reasonably of concern to that agency or organization.”180 Defendant had conveyed the information to the envi172

Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (N.D. Ill.
2013).
173
Id.
174
Id. at 1031.
175
Id. at 1031, 1038.
176
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010) (“A person who communicates a complaint or
information to any branch or agency of federal, state, or local government, or to any selfregulatory organization that regulates persons involved in the securities or futures
business and that has been delegated authority by a federal, state, or local government
agency and is subject to oversight by the delegating agency, is immune from civil liability for
claims based upon the communication to the agency or organization regarding any matter
reasonably of concern to that agency or organization . . . .” (emphasis added)).
177
Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 1038.
180
Id. at 1037 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010)).
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ronmental protection agencies.181 Moreover, the court found that
reports of shipping hazardous waste in contravention of state and
federal law to be of reasonable concern to those agencies.182 Therefore, the court found the statements made to the government immune under section 4.24.510.183
The lower court conducted an extensive analysis of Rule 12(d)
in its decision not to apply section 4.24.525, the special motion to
dismiss. First, it engaged in the requisite Shady Grove analysis,184
framing the precise question: Whether a federal court may look to
the pleadings and to outside materials and dismiss a plaintiff’s
claims preliminarily based on defendant’s showing “that those
claims are based on an action involving public participation and petition” and plaintiff’s subsequent failure to “establish by clear and
convincing evidence a probability of prevailing” on the claim?185
The court then quoted Rule 12(d) in full.186 The court found that
the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure added Rule
12(d) in 1946 to “link Rule 12 with Rule 56 to provide the exclusive
means for federal courts to rule upon a pretrial motion to adjudicate a case on the merits based on matters outside the complaint.”187 The Advisory Committee clarified that if extraneous
material is included under Rule 12(b)(6), the motion would become
a summary judgment motion.188 If the motion becomes a summary
judgment motion, then both parties must have a reasonable opportunity to submit extraneous proofs “to avoid taking a party by surprise.”189
181

Id.
Id. at 1038.
183
Id. However, the court found the statements did not immunize defendant for claims
arising under section 4.24.510 for communications made to the media or on the Internet.
Id. at 1038–39.
184
See id. at 1042–44.
185
Id. at 1044.
186
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all material that is pertinent to the motion.”).
187
Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (quoting 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 98
(D.D.C. 2012)).
188
Id. at 1045.
189
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment).
182
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As compared to Rule 12(d), section 4.24.525 directly interferes
with the federal rules’ mode of operation, and is therefore void.
First, section 4.24.525 poses a higher evidentiary burden on a
plaintiff than does Rule 12 and allows dismissal on the merits without tying the motion to summary judgment.190 Second, the mandatory language of section 4.24.525 conflicts with the discretionary
operation of Rule 12(d).191 Last, section 4.24.525 imposes a clear
and convincing standard on plaintiffs, without discovery, in contravention of the “genuine issue of material fact” standard of Rule
56.192 For those reasons, the Northern District of Illinois refused to
apply section 4.24.525, and denied defendant’s motion to dismiss
Intercon’s defamation claims.193
III. ABBAS, INTERCON, AND DIVERSE SLAPPS
Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction should follow Abbas and Intercon. Anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss disrupt the exclusive method of pretrial procedure inscribed in Rules 12 and 56, as
linked by Rule 12(d). As a matter of pretrial procedure, the courts
have repeatedly insisted on maintaining important federal interests,
to wit, uniform pleading and summary judgment practice. The likelihood that Abbas will create forum shopping does not warrant its
reversal, because the Constitution created diversity jurisdiction in
part to combat local prejudice. Moreover, the rule in Abbas and Intercon, when combined with the significant protections of the First
Amendment, does not make it any easier for plaintiffs to prevail.
Anti-SLAPP statutes with special motions to dismiss are not
Erie-substantive, and therefore do not apply in federal court. Defendants arguing the opposite will likely point to two reasons. First,
190

Id. at 1047.
Id. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court . . . .”
(emphasis added)), with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(b) (2010) (“In making a
determination under (b) of this subsection, the court shall consider pleadings and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is
based.” (emphasis added)).
192
Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
193
Id. at 1055. The court noted that the plaintiff, a public figure, had sufficiently pled
actual malice, and that defendant’s statements were not statements of opinion. Id. at
1057–58.
191
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a nominally procedural rule that works to define the scope of the
state-created right should apply in federal court. Second, if the rule
is found not to be substantive, it will create serious forum shopping
concerns.
The first argument relies upon Justice Stevens’ concurrence in
Shady Grove for support. First, if the federal and state rules can
coexist side by side, then the court must follow Erie and the Rules
of Decision Act.194 Because the anti-SLAPP statutes apply only to
suits challenging constitutional free speech rights, they are meant
to supplement, not supplant, the general federal rules.195 Second,
even if there is a direct collision, courts should not presume
preemption, especially if such a preemptive reading contravenes
the Rules Enabling Act.196 The federal rules should be read with
sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.197
Here, defendants find that the anti-SLAPP statute creates a right—
the ability to dismiss certain suits based on constitutional free
speech at pretrial—that, while nominally procedural, is really substantive.
The second argument raises a serious concern: Failure to apply
anti-SLAPP statutes in diversity will create forum shopping and
inequitable administration of the laws. The courts in Godin and
Newsham applied the anti-SLAPP statutes partly out of this fear.198
Under this line of reasoning, a plaintiff suing a diverse defendant
over a defamatory news story would always choose the federal forum, knowing the statute would not apply. As a result, the defendant would be treated inequitably, as the defendant cannot avail
herself of what she believes to be a substantive state right.
The first argument fails because the federal rules so obviously
conflict with the state rule. To survive a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only allege facts sufficient to state a
194

See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 421
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
195
See, e.g., Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010).
196
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 422–23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)).
197
See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001);
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996).
198
See Godin, 629 F.3d at 91; United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999).
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facially plausible claim.199 Moreover, “plausibility” is not “akin to
a probability requirement.”200 Special motions to dismiss, however, require a plaintiff to establish “by clear and convincing evidence
a probability of prevailing on the claim.”201 This same standard
generally conflicts with Rule 56, which requires only a preponderance of the evidence standard.202 Moreover, anti-SLAPP statutes
require a stay of discovery, as opposed to Rule 56, which allows for
liberal discovery prior to summary judgment.203 The statutes require that a court consider materials outside the pleadings, but
without tying the motion to summary judgment, in contrast to Rule
12(d).204 Finally, Rules 12 and 56, like all the other rules, apply to
all cases in federal court, necessarily occupying the field of the antiSLAPP statutes.205 Therefore, there is a direct conflict, and Rules
12 and 56 apply.
The existence of a direct collision with Rules 12 and 56 calls for
the rules’ application, not their exclusion. Even Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., a case applying Rule 41(b) with
sensitivity to state claim preclusion law, stated that “federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which
the state law is incompatible with federal interests.”206 Here, the
federal interest supports uniform procedure, which might not be
attained if the courts defer to each state’s particular anti-SLAPP
statute.207 The cleaner approach, therefore, is to allow the federal
rules to stand on their own.
199

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
201
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(b) (2010) (emphasis added).
202
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
203
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(5)(c); see also 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2721
(3d ed. 1998).
204
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(c).
205
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400
(2010) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
206
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (“If, for
example, state law did not accord claim-preclusive effect to dismissals for willful violation
of discovery orders, federal courts’ interest in the integrity of their own processes might
justify a contrary federal rule.”).
207
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965); see also Makaeff v. Trump Univ.,
LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, J., dissenting) (finding that California
200
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While forum shopping and inequitable administration are valid
concerns, reference to Erie is inappropriate when comparing a federal rule of civil procedure with a state rule. Invalidating a federal
rule whenever it alters enforcement of state rights would “disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling
Act.”208 This statement in Hanna, quoted in Shady Grove, echoes
the belief that created diversity jurisdiction in the first place: Foreign citizens may be prejudiced in state courts against resident defendants.209 The Supreme Court famously expressed this sentiment in Bank of United States v. Deveaux:
However, true the fact may be, that the tribunals of
the states will administer justice as impartially as
those of the nation, to parties of every description, it
is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with
such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between
aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different
states.210
The Constitution itself allows federal courts to administer disputes between diverse citizens, and as to procedure, some divergence from state law is the attendant, and perhaps intended, result.211
In addition, the fact that a defendant may not use a special motion to dismiss does not spell a victory for a plaintiff or a Pyrrhic
victory for a defendant. As Intercon demonstrated, the immunity
anti-SLAPP statute, section 4.24.510, still applied in federal court
as a substantive defense.212 State law immunities are still substanhas amalgamated California’s anti-SLAPP and Rule 56, leaving a crippled anti-SLAPP
statute that applies some, but not all, of each).
208
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74.
209
See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483, 493 (1928).
210
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (1809).
211
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 416
(2010).
212
See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
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tive under Erie.213 Looking next at Abbas, the D.C. Circuit still dismissed plaintiff for failure to state a plausible defamation claim under Rule 12(b)(6).214 The above cases demonstrate that federal
courts are well-suited for early dismissal of meritless claims. This is
especially important, as anti-SLAPP statutes exist to minimize the
costs of a legal defense.215
Finally, it is not at all certain that a plaintiff is likely to win on a
public libel defamation case in the first instance. As highlighted in
Section I.A, a libel defendant can rely on three structural protections: evidentiary, interpretive (a court will not quickly infer libel
based on certain words and their possible meanings), and procedural.216 Given these protections, resort to federal court may not
result in the mischief that the anti-SLAPP statutes sought to remedy.
CONCLUSION
Application of the federal rules will not completely disembowel
the policy of the states to support free speech. First, they do not
target all anti-SLAPP provisions, merely those that conflict with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal courts following Abbas and the federal rules can still screen out meritless claims and
protect free speech. Resort to federal courts may inevitably create
divergences in the federal and state courts, but the U.S. Constitution has embedded this policy so that federal courts across the
country may apply uniformly. Finally, applications of the federal
rules will not result in a parade of horribles for libel defendants.
The Supreme Court has erected protective barriers that, as a
whole, maintain the important values of free speech in public society.
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See, e.g., Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617, 620–21 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that the
substantive law of Vermont governs the applicability of qualified immunity to plaintiff’s
state law claims).
214
See discussion supra Section II.B.
215
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2011) (awarding costs and
attorney’s fees to successful anti-SLAPP movants).
216
See discussion supra Section I.A.

